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Our ability to learn from the outcomes of our actions and to adapt our decisions
accordingly changes over the course of the human lifespan. In recent years, there has
been an increasing interest in using computational models to understand developmental
changes in learning and decision-making. Moreover, extensions of these models are
currently applied to study socio-emotional influences on learning in different age groups,
a topic that is of great relevance for applications in education and health psychology.
In this article, we aim to provide an introduction to basic ideas underlying computational
models of reinforcement learning and focus on parameters and model variants that might
be of interest to developmental scientists. We then highlight recent attempts to use
reinforcement learning models to study the influence of social information on learning
across development. The aim of this review is to illustrate how computational models
can be applied in developmental science, what they can add to our understanding of
developmental mechanisms and how they can be used to bridge the gap between
psychological and neurobiological theories of development.
Keywords: reinforcement learning, cognitivemodeling, decision-making, social cognition, lifespan, developmental
neuroscience
In our daily lives, we constantly need to learn about the conditions of our environment to improve
our future choices. Which ice cream will I enjoy most? What school should I send my children to?
How much money should I save for retirement? While the kinds of choices we have to deal with
change throughout the lifespan, so do the strategies with which we approach decisions in order
to find an optimal solution. Understanding how learning and decision-making is affected by age
is therefore crucial for adapting structures and processes in educational, occupational, or health
contexts to different target groups.
Over the past few years, computational approaches such as reinforcement learning (RL)
models (Sutton and Barto, 1998) have become increasingly popular in psychology and cognitive
neuroscience. One big advantage of these models over descriptive (verbal) theories is that they
allow us to explicitly formalize cognitive processes. That is, we can use thesemodels tomake explicit
numerical predictions regarding the effects of experimental manipulations on outcome measures.
This level of specificity is difficult to achieve with verbal theories alone. Moreover, computational
models can be used to simulate behavior and thus also to simulate potential limitations of
sub-processes that come with development, aging, or pathology (e.g., Nassar et al., 2016). Another
important qualitative advantage of computational models is that they can provide access to latent
cognitive processes. For example, many researchers are interested in the psychological processes
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underlying performance monitoring or in the question of how
people handle conflicts between habitual and goal-directed
response tendencies. Computationalmodels allow us to formalize
these latent processes and make them accessible for empirical
approaches. Finally, one of the main reasons for the increasing
popularity of these models in cognitive neuroscience is that they
can be used to derive time varying variables of computational
processes that can be correlated with neurophysiological data
(e.g., O’Doherty et al., 2004; Gläscher et al., 2010). These so-called
“model-based” analyses can provide insights into the neural
dynamics underlying cognitive processes that are difficult to
achieve with the standard approaches.
For researchers in lifespan developmental neuroscience,
computational modeling techniques are particularly promising
because they might provide new insights into developmental
processes that lead to changes in learning and decision-making
and how they relate to the development of neurobiological
function (van den Bos et al., 2017). While most of the
current research in the area of computational neuroscience
has focused on individual learning and decision-making, there
is an increasing interest in using computational methods to
understand social influences on learning and choice behavior
(Behrens et al., 2008, 2009; Diaconescu et al., 2014, 2017).
This new emerging research trend seems particularly relevant
for the developmental field because of the immense impact of
social influences on developmental processes, especially during
childhood and adolescence (Ainsworth, 1989; Herrmann et al.,
2007; Blakemore, 2008; Somerville, 2013).
In this review, we will outline how developmental
psychologists can make use of modeling approaches to study
age-related changes in learning and decision-making. We will
demonstrate how the basic computational algorithms of RL
can be extended and modified to address questions about the
developmental trajectories of learning and decision-making
processes across one’s lifespan. The first section will introduce
and briefly summarize the fundamental principles of RL models.
We will then discuss how the computational level is linked to
psychological constructs and theories about human development
by giving examples from the literature on the development of
learning and decision-making in non-social settings. Finally,
the employment of modeling techniques in the context of social
decision-making will be reviewed, and we will show how existing
models can be applied to developmental questions on social
learning.
BASIC REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
MODELS
Many of our preferences (e.g., for one type of ice cream over
another) are shaped by experience-driven learning mechanisms.
That is, we sample our environment (our favorite ice cream
parlor), and depending on our evaluation of the outcomes, we
update the value representations of the different types of ice
cream.
RL models provide a formalization of how a human
(or non-human) agent learns from experience to maximize her
FIGURE 1 | Structure of a real-world decision as a Markov decision process.
The state “ice cream 922 parlor” has two available actions, “chocolate ice
cream” and “strawberry ice cream”. With a certain probability (represented by
numbers next to the arrows), each choice leads to either a reward state or a
non-reward state.
reward in a given environment (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Inmany
situations, RL can be understood in terms of a Markov decision
process (MDP). An MDP consists of distinct states an agent can
find herself in (e.g., different sensory inputs), and each state
provides the agent with a set of available actions. On performing
one of these actions, the agent moves to a new state according
to a transition function that defines the probability of arriving
in this state given the previous state and the selected action.
Figure 1 illustrates how this structure applies to a simplified
example (similar to a two-alternative forced choice task in a
psychological experiment). Here, a person repeatedly chooses
between two types of ice cream, where each choice is followed
by either a pleasant taste (outcome value = 1) or a neutral taste
(outcome value = 0). The outcome values are on an arbitrary
scale and only become meaningful in relation to each other.
Typically, positive values represent rewards and negative values
losses or punishments. Importantly, whether a type of ice cream
is experienced as pleasant or not can be different even after
identical choices (maybe because there is variance in the product
quality or because the taste also depends on factors that we do
not account for, such as the person’s mood). If the probability of
experiencing a pleasant taste is higher after choosing one type of
ice cream than after choosing the other, the person will eventually
develop a preference for the most pleasant type of ice cream, thus
maximizing the number of pleasant taste experiences in the long
run.
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In order to optimize behavior, the agent needs to iteratively
update her reward expectation of different actions. In RL models,
this is formalized as a state-action value Q(s,a) that represents
the subjective expectation of reward from performing action a in
state s. The example introduced above involves two state-action
values, Q(ice cream parlor, chocolate) and Q(ice cream parlor,
strawberry). If both state-action values are equal, the participant
does not prefer either type of ice cream. With learning, the
participant continuously updates her prediction about the value
of the two flavors based on the perceived discrepancy between the
expected and the actually experienced reward. This discrepancy is
expressed by the reward prediction error δ that is computed after
an agent has performed action a in state s:
δ = r(s′)+ Q
(
s′, a′
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
experienced reward
− Q (s, a)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected reward
(1)
Here, s′ is the new state the agent has moved to, where she
receives a reward with value r(s′) and is going to perform another
action a′. Importantly, in this equation the experienced reward
is the sum of the immediately obtained reward r(s′) and the
prospective future reward represented by the state-action value
for the action in the new state Q(s′, a′).
To illustrate how the computation of a reward prediction error
works, consider a person who expects chocolate ice cream to
be moderately rewarding (Q(ice cream parlor, chocolate) = 0.6)
and, having selected chocolate ice cream, experiences a pleasant
taste (r(s′) = 1). In this example task, the experienced reward is
completely determined by the immediate reward because after
tasting the ice cream, no further actions are available (Q(s′, a′)
= 0). Then, the reward prediction error is computed as the
difference between experienced and expected reward, which is
δ = (1+ 0)− 0.6 = 0.4. If the experienced reward is larger than
the expected reward (better than expected outcome), the reward
prediction error δ will take a positive value. Conversely, if the
experienced reward is smaller than the expected reward (worse
than expected outcome), δ will be negative.
The reward prediction error is then used to update the state-
action value:
Q (s, a)← Q (s, a)+ αδ (2)
The individual learning rate α indicates how strongly the most
recent experience is weighted relative to previous experiences
when updating the state-action value. If α= 0, the new experience
is not at all taken into account (even if your current chocolate ice
cream does not taste as predicted, you will not change your future
expectation) and the state-action value remains unchanged. If
α = 1, the new state-action value is completely updated by the
new experience (your attitude toward a type of ice cream is
determined only by the last time you tasted it). Intermediate
values of α reflect a certain balance between the recent experience
and previous ones. That is, you consider both your last cup of ice
cream as well as other ice cream you have had in the past when
making a decision. Figure 2A illustrates how a state-action value
evolves given different learning rates.
From Learning to Action Selection
So far, we have only considered the question of how value
expectations are built and updated. However, for an agent it
is also important how to translate value representations into
actions. That is, how does our preference for one type of ice cream
over the other makes us choose one of them? Most RL models
assume that actions are selected probabilistically. The probability
that an agent selects a particular action ai out of all available
actions is usually modeled with a softmax function:
P (ai|s) =
exp(βQ (s, ai))
∑
k exp(βQ (s, ak))
(3)
The inverse softmax temperature β controls the extent to which
differences in state-action values affect action selection. If β
= 0, differences in state-action values have no effect and all
actions are selected with equal probability.With increasing values
of β, it becomes more and more likely to select the action
with the highest state-action value. The specific form of the
softmax function guarantees that the probability of selecting an
action is relative to the respective state-action value and that
the probabilities of all available actions in one state add up
to 1. Figure 2B exemplifies how β affects the mapping from
state-action values to probabilities.
LINKING MODEL PARAMETERS TO
PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTS
Learning Rate
Learning from Positive vs. Negative Prediction Errors
Until now, we have treated positive and negative prediction
errors alike in terms of their effects on updating value
representations. However, it is intuitively clear that a negative
prediction error might have different implications for behavior
than a positive prediction error. For example, your favorite
ice cream might suddenly induce an allergic reaction (negative
prediction error). Consequently, you will shift your preference
and avoid this ice cream. In contrast, in most cases, positive
prediction errors will reinforce existing behavior or preferences.
Psychological theories assume that the ability to adapt behavior
to negative consequence involves performance monitoring
processes that rely on prefrontal structures such as the
medial prefrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the
insula (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Ullsperger and von Cramon,
2003; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). In contrast, learning from
positive outcomes has been suggested to involve dopaminergic
projections to limbic and paralimbic areas such as the ventral
striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (Schultz
et al., 1997; Montague et al., 2004; D’Ardenne et al., 2008),
although some subregions of the vmPFC may also be involved
in error monitoring (Maier et al., 2015; Buzzell et al., 2017).
Interestingly, these distinct neural systems have different
developmental trajectories. Structural as well as functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) revealed that prefrontal
areas involved in learning from negative outcomes show a
protracted development compared to limbic and paralimbic
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Development of a state-action value for two different learning rates. For the purpose of illustration, we assume that the agent makes identical choices
across all trials. Filled and empty circles indicate trials in which the action was rewarded (r = 1) or not rewarded (r = 0), respectively. With a high learning rate (light
line), the state-action value estimate fluctuates strongly, representing the rewards of the most recent trials. In contrast, with a low learning rate (dark line), the
state-action value is more stable because it pools over more of the previous trials. (B) The higher the inverse softmax temperature, the more it is likely to prefer an
action with a state-action value of 1 over another action with a state-action value of 0.
circuits involved in learning from reward (Sowell et al., 2003;
Gogtay et al., 2004). Note however, that different subregions
of the vmPFC show heterogeneous developmental trajectories
(e.g., Shaw et al., 2008), which calls for a closer investigation
of age-related effects in these areas. Moreover, a recent source
localization EEG study (Buzzell et al., 2017) investigating error
processing in 9–35 year old participants showed a linear
association between age and error-related electrophysiological
activity presumably originating from the insula or the inferior
frontal gyrus. Both regions have been previously implicated
in punishment-based learning (Palminteri et al., 2012) or the
inhibition of maladaptive actions (Aron et al., 2004).
Consistent with the neuroimaging evidence for differential
developmental trajectories in the brain systems involved in
learning from positive and negative outcomes behavioral and
electrophysiological studies indicate that children have problems
in evaluating the informativeness of negative feedback during
probabilistic learning (Crone et al., 2004; van Duijvenvoorde
et al., 2008; Eppinger et al., 2009).What has beenmissing inmany
of the previous studies on learning from positive vs. negative
outcomes is a clear characterization of the computational
mechanisms underlying each of these different behavioral
strategies.
Standard RL models assume one common updating
mechanism for all kinds of outcomes regardless of their valence,
which makes it difficult to capture diverging developmental
trajectories for learning from gains vs. losses. To overcome this
limitation, researchers have extended classical RL models by
introducing two distinct learning rates, α+ and α−, instead of a
single learning rate parameter. Thus, the specific learning rate
can be applied depending on whether the reward prediction
error signals a better than expected or a worse than expected
outcome.
Q (s, a)←
{
Q (s, a)+ α+δ if δ ≥ 0
Q (s, a)+ α−δ if δ < 0
(4)
The only study that has investigated learning from gains and
losses across development showed that the impact of negative
reward prediction errors decreased with age (van den Bos et al.,
2012). Studies in adolescents found an age-related enhancement
in the sensitivity to worse than expected outcomes from
adolescence to adulthood (Christakou et al., 2013; Hauser et al.,
2015). Taken together, the few existing studies point to substantial
changes in the impact of gains and losses across childhood
development and adolescence. Clearly, more research is needed
in this area, and future studies should adjust the tasks and
procedures in a way that younger individuals (i.e., younger than
8 years of age) can be included.
Adaptive Learning Rates
While distinct learning rates for positive and negative prediction
errors allow for a somewhat more flexible responses to different
situational demands, the impact of new information in these
models remains constant over time. This is a questionable
assumption, because most of our environments are changing
dynamically and we have to flexibly adjust the degree of learning.
For example, if you know that the quality of your favorite ice
cream varies a lot between single scoops, it makes no sense to
completely revise your value prediction just because the ice cream
did not meet your expectations once. In contrast, if you learned
that the ice creammanufacturer recently changed the recipe, even
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a single disappointing experience might make you buy a different
type of ice cream next time.
The idea to adaptively adjust learning rates has also been
implemented in RL models (Krugel et al., 2009). Here, the
learning rate itself is updated in every trial depending on
whether recent reward prediction errors increase (a change to the
environment has occurred and the impact of new information
should be high) or decrease (indicating stable environmental
conditions). Recent work in adolescents shows no difference
in learning rate adaptation between teenagers and adults in a
reversal learning task (Javadi et al., 2014). However, so far, this
is the only study in this domain, and childhood developmental
differences have not (yet) been addressed. In addition, it should
be noted that in current RL approaches the mechanisms that
regulate the relationship between prediction error and learning
rate are unclear. Recent work using Bayesian models of belief
updating tried to address these shortcomings. For example,
research by Nassar et al. (2016) on aging-related changes in
learning rate adjustments showed that older adults have a specific
deficit in uncertainty-driven learning that manifests as a problem
in adjusting learning rates to small changes in prediction errors.
Future work should focus on developmental changes in the
factors that regulate the degree of learning in dynamically
changing environments. Furthermore, more research should be
devoted to developmental differences in the interplay of medial
prefrontal systems involved in the regulation of learning rates
and their interaction with neuro-modulatory systems such as the
norepinephrine and dopamine system. Finally, developmental
disorders such as autism and attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder are interesting research targets. For example, recent
work suggests that adults with autism tend to overestimate the
volatility of their environment, which makes them less sensitive
to surprising environmental changes (Lawson et al., 2017).
However, the ontogenetic development of these biases or their
relationship to changes in neuro-modulatory systems remains to
be determined.
Softmax Temperature
We sometimes deviate from what would be the optimal behavior
in a given situation. In the framework of RL, this means that an
agent might pick an option that does not have the highest state-
action value among all available actions. The degree to which
state-action values guide action selection is regulated by the
inverse softmax temperature, where lower values indicate a high
level of behavioral stochasticity (i.e., choices are barely controlled
by state-action values and are mainly due to chance) and action
selection becomes more and more deterministic with increasing
parameter values.
Two major psychological interpretations of the softmax
temperature parameter have been offered: On the one hand,
one can think of it as representing the individual sensitivity
to differences in state-action values. From this perspective,
deviations from the most rewarding options are considered as
being due to random noise in the selection process or the lack
of distinct value representations for alternative actions. Thus,
theories that connect lifespan developmental differences in the
dopaminergic system with transformations in the neural signal-
to-noise ratio (Li et al., 2010; Li and Rieckmann, 2014) make
the prediction that this parameter is likely to change across
development.
Alternatively, choice stochasticity can be regarded as reflecting
exploration of one’s environment (as opposed to exploitation of
familiar options). The inverse softmax temperature parameter
then represents the degree of exploratory behavior (e.g., Daw
et al., 2006). Enhanced exploratory behavior and risk-seeing
is thought to be characteristic of adolescent behavior (Crone
and Dahl, 2012; Crone and Steinbeis, 2017), which leads to the
hypothesis that differences in the inverse softmax temperature
parameter could also be accounted for by age-related shifts with
respect to exploratory tendencies.
Indeed, developmental studies find that adolescents’ behavior
is best described by RL models with higher stochasticity as
compared to younger adults. Javadi et al. (2014) used a reversal
learning task with adolescents and younger adults and found
that adolescents’ choices were less controlled by differences
in reward expectations than the choices of younger adults.
Likewise, Christakou et al. (2013) report a lower inverse softmax
temperature in adolescents than in adults for behavior in the
Iowa Gambling Task. These age differences in choice stochasticity
were associated with task performance and can be interpreted as
reflecting increased exploratory behavior in adolescence.
It is beyond the scope of both conventional RL models and
decision-making tasks to make a clear statement on whether
observed choice stochasticity represents deliberately exploratory
or merely random behavior. For future research, it would be
desirable to better differentiate how these two processes develop
across the human lifespan. In order to disentangle exploratory
from random behavior, Wilson et al. (2014a) have put forward
a decision-making task where they manipulate the amount of
information an agent has about the outcomes of the available
options before making choices. The authors argue that higher
preferences for a less-known option signal that a decision-maker
assigns value to collecting information about the environment,
which is indicative of exploratory behavior. They also formalize
this idea in a computational model of the action selection process.
A recent study by Somerville et al. (2017) applied this paradigm
and found that strategic exploratory behavior increased from
adolescence to adulthood, while random behavior remained
constant.
Model-Based Learning
The RL models formalized above represent model-free RL
approaches. That is, the learner is not assumed to have explicit
knowledge about the task structure (i.e., a model of the
environment). Model-free RL is neither computationally nor
cognitively very demanding because at decision time, one just
needs to retrieve and compare a limited set of state-action values
(Daw et al., 2005). However, state-action values can be adapted
only retrospectively after an outcome has been experienced,
and thus model-free RL can be rather slow and inflexible in
dynamic environments. For example, having eaten chocolate
cakes ad nauseam every day of last week, one might have a
temporarily reduced preference for everything that tastes like
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chocolate. Nevertheless, a model-free learner would not be able
to consider this devaluation of chocolate ice cream beforehand
but would need to experience the new dislike of chocolate ice
cream multiple times, until the respective state-action values are
sufficiently updated.
An alternative RL approach, model-based learning, might
be more appropriate to describe human behavior in such
situations. Here, the agent is aware of the principles of the
environment, for example the rewards associated with each state
and the probabilities for moving between states, and can use
this knowledge for forward planning. In the example above,
anticipating the taste of chocolate, the model-based learner can
immediately reduce the reward expectation of going for chocolate
ice cream. While this allows for more flexible behavior, it comes
at the cost of greater computational or cognitive effort.
Current psychological theories assume that human behavior
is best described as a mixture of model-free and model-based
RL strategies (Gläscher et al., 2010; Daw et al., 2011). By
using a hybrid model of model-free and model-based RL and
estimating the relative weight of both processes, several studies
have investigated how model-based control develops across the
lifespan. From childhood to early adulthood, the ability to make
use ofmodel-based RL strategies in a prominent decision-making
task increases progressively (Decker et al., 2016; Li and Eppinger,
2016; Potter et al., 2017), and this effect is mediated by an
increasing ability in fluid reasoning (Potter et al., 2017). In
older age, the use of model-based strategies declines (Eppinger
et al., 2013b; Worthy et al., 2014), a process that does not
seem to be fully explained by age-related impairment in working
memory capacity (Eppinger et al., 2013b). Thus, the development
of model-based decision-making across the human lifespan
parallels age-related differences in cognitive control that show
maturation until adulthood and a decline with aging (Braver and
Barch, 2002; Luna et al., 2015).
While developmental studies so far have focused on
differences in model-based control between individuals, there is
also an increasing interest in the intraindividual adaptation of the
model-based weight. Research with young adults has shown that
humans adapt the balance between model-free and model-based
RL according to situational demands such as current working
memory load (Otto et al., 2013a), stress (Otto et al., 2013b;
Radenbach et al., 2015), predictability of the environment (Daw
et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2014; Eppinger et al., 2017), or incentive
size (Kool et al., 2017). How exactly the brain determines which
of the two systems is in charge at one point in time and how
this arbitration process is affected by age is an interesting avenue
for future research. Moreover, there are also other important
questions with respect to model-based processes and how they
change with age that have not yet been addressed: For example,
it is currently unclear how models of the environment are
represented in the brain and how these representations are
updated. The few available studies suggest that fronto-parietal
networks are involved in model-based learning (Gläscher et al.,
2010) and that the orbitofrontal cortex may play a role in
presenting latent (not directly observable) information about the
structure of the world (Wilson et al., 2014b; Schuck et al., 2016).
However, we are far away from a clear characterization of the
underlying neural processes and how they change as a function
of development.
MODELING ANALYSES BEYOND
PARAMETER ESTIMATION
Model Selection
In the previous sections, we described how estimating the model
parameters that best describe some behavior is an efficient way of
specifying differences in learning and decision-making between
age groups. However, the advantages of computational modeling
are not limited to parameter estimation. Sometimes, there are
multiple models available for explaining behavior in a task,
each representing a different assumption about the involvement
and interaction of specific cognitive processes. In this case,
the direct comparison of competing computational models can
reveal which out of a set of candidate models accounts best for
behavior and can therefore be highly informative with respect
to qualitative differences in cognitive processing between age
groups.
For example, Palminteri et al. (2016) fitted RL models of
increasing complexity to the behavior of adolescents and young
adults in a probabilistic choice task. Specifically, these models
differed with respect to whether they allowed for learning
from counterfactual information (that is, information about the
potential outcome of the option that was not chosen) and for the
contextualization of outcomes relative to a reference point. They
found that the simplest model explained adolescents’ choices best
while the most complex model accounted best for the decisions
of the young adults. Thus, their findings suggest that learning
strategies become more sophisticated with development. In a
similar vein, Worthy et al. (2014) used model comparison to
show differences in strategy use between younger and older adults
in a decision-making task. Here, even though both age groups did
not differ in overall task performance, older adults showed more
evidence for a simple win-stay lose-shift heuristic compared to
younger adults whose choices were best described by a weighted
mixture of model-free and model-based RL.
Model-Based fMRI
In the field of cognitive neuroscience, there is a strong interest
in model-based fMRI analyses that focus on neural correlates
of latent model variables, such as reward prediction errors or
state-action values (O’Doherty et al., 2007). For instance, a
central finding in studies combining RL models with fMRI is
the observation that the blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD)
response in the ventral striatum reflects a reward prediction
error signal (e.g., O’Doherty et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2008).
Developmental neuroscientists thus examined whether age-
related differences in the strength of neural signals associated
with these variables can offer a mechanistic explanation for
differences in behavior. Indeed, in older adults, the neural
correlates of reward prediction errors seem to be impaired
(Chowdhury et al., 2013; Eppinger et al., 2013a; Samanez-Larkin
et al., 2014) but can be partially restored by a pharmacological
intervention that increases intracerebral dopamine, leading also
to enhanced task performance (Chowdhury et al., 2013). Thus,
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RL models can provide access to mechanisms (e.g., integrity
of reward prediction error signal) that link the neural level
(dopamine) and the behavioral level (task performance).
In adolescents, the evidence for alterations of the reward
prediction error signal is less clear. A study by Cohen et al.
(2010) reported an increased BOLD response to positive
reward prediction errors in the ventral striatum for adolescents
compared to both children and young adults, suggesting a
mechanism for greater reward sensitivity during this age.
However, other studies (e.g., van den Bos et al., 2012; Christakou
et al., 2013) could not replicate this effect, possibly due to
differences in task design or the participants’ age range.
In most of the previous research in younger adults, the BOLD
response in the vmPFC is associated with changes in state-action
values during learning (Gläscher et al., 2009). Yet, so far there are
only a few studies that looked at age-related changes in this signal.
Christakou et al. (2013) report the neural representation of state-
action values to become stronger from adolescence to adulthood;
however, they did not find this to be related to behavioral
differences. In older adults, state-action value signals are reduced
(Tobia et al., 2016; de Boer et al., 2017) and signal strength
predicts performance in a probabilistic decision-making task (de
Boer et al., 2017), suggesting that the age-related deterioration of
value signals in the vmPFC may explain the behavioral deficits.
To summarize, computational modeling can identify
developmental differences in learning and decision-making
not only by capturing quantitative differences in parameters
that represent psychological processes but also by comparing
qualitatively different formalizations of cognitive mechanisms
and by detecting age-related changes in the neurophysiological
implementation of these processes.
MODELING SOCIAL LEARNING
MECHANISMS ACROSS THE LIFESPAN
So far, we have only considered how individuals learn from
their own actions. However, humans are fundamentally social
beings (Fiske, 2009). For decades, psychologists have observed
that social context influences decision-making and behavioral
adaptation is realized in accordance with our social environment
(e.g., Lewin, 1952; Asch, 1956). Yet most computational studies
on the development of learning and decision-making have
left social factors aside. The RL models reviewed above can
be extended to describe mechanisms of social learning and
exchange. In the following, we outline how such extensions have
been implemented. We stress their relevance for key questions
that have been asked about the development of social cognition
over the past decades. We first tap into a process that remains
important throughout the course of the human lifespan, namely
the ability to learn from others, by observation, by social feedback,
or from instruction. A further key question of developmental
psychology has always been the development of social cognition
or Theory of Mind (ToM; Frith and Frith, 2003). Thus, in a
second step we describe how computational formulations can
help to elucidate how we learn about others, that is, update our
ToM about others.
Learning from Others
Observational Learning
Although the process of learning from the consequences of one’s
own behavior through direct experience, as reviewed above, is
pivotal for survival, it is rather time-consuming and potentially
dangerous. Thus, many species have developed the ability to learn
from others via observational learning (e.g., Tomasello et al.,
1987), which is also of great interest from a human ontogenetic
perspective as it is suggested as an important factor for cognitive
and social development (Nielsen and Tomaselli, 2010; Meltzoff,
2013; Waismeyer and Meltzoff, 2017).
In RL terms, learning from observations means to compute
observational prediction errors, namely the deviance of the
expected reward and the reward that the other person receives,
depending on the state the other person is in and the action the
other person has undertaken.
δobs = robs(s
′)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
observed reward
− Q (s, a)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected reward
(5)
Q(s, a) ← Q (s,a)+ αobsδobs (6)
δobs is then multiplied by the observational learning rate αobs
which represents how fast participants learn from observed, not
directly experienced outcomes. This update rule leads to an
observationally-updated state-action value that individuals can
use to make their own decisions. Observationally achieved state-
action values can subsequently be updated using experienced
prediction errors after taking an action and experiencing an
outcome oneself.
Burke et al. (2010) applied such a computational account to
a probabilistic, reward-based observational learning paradigm
during fMRI in younger adults. They could show that
observational outcome prediction errors correlated with activity
in the vmPFC and the ventral striatum, similar to experienced
outcome prediction errors (O’Doherty et al., 2004).
Learning from others’ actions even in the absence of outcome
information has been modeled using action prediction errors
(Burke et al., 2010; Suzuki et al., 2012) that are computed as
the probability that the observed choice ai would not have been
selected by oneself:
δact = 1− P (ai|s)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expectation about action
(7)
Note that such action prediction errors are unsigned in nature,
coding surprise about an observed action, rather than surprise
and valence like in the case of a rewarding vs. punishing outcome.
By means of this action prediction error, the choice probability
is directly updated and the strength of this update is controlled
by an imitation factor κ, in analogy to the learning rate in
experiential learning (compare Equation 2).
P (ai|s)← P (ai|s)+ κδact (8)
Action prediction errors have been shown to be associated with
activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in young adults
(Burke et al., 2010; Suzuki et al., 2012).
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A recent EEG study (Rodriguez Buritica et al., 2016)
investigated observational learning in school-aged children
by manipulating the amount of social information as
well as the social partner the children were learning from
(comparing child to adult learning model). The results of
these study show that children seem to have problems to
rapidly assess the informational value of social feedback
during learning and consequently up-regulate their response
to observed and experienced negative feedback, as reflected
in the amplitude of medial prefrontal event-related potential
(ERP) components. Moreover, children tend to imitate behavior
more when the observed player is a child, compared to an
adult, indicating that social information does impact the
degree to which information is integrated during learning
(Rodriguez Buritica et al., 2016).
Rodriguez Buritica et al. (2016) did not use computational
modeling in their study. However, the computational account
of observational learning described above could be readily
applied to these data. One advantage would be that learning
could be captured in a trial-by-trial manner (behaviorally
as well as neurally), which avoids the block-wise average
approach the authors have used here as an approximation to
learning. In this framework, it would be interesting to contrast
electrophysiological correlates of experiential and observed
outcome prediction errors as well as action prediction errors in
a modeling-informed trial-by-trial ERP analysis. Such modeling-
informed single-trial analyses of the feedback-related negativity
(FRN) and different types of prediction errors have recently
been demonstrated in young adults (Ullsperger et al., 2014;
Reiter et al., 2016). Given the relatively late maturation of the
ventrolateral and particularly the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(Gogtay et al., 2004) and the involvement of these brain regions
in observational learning in young adults (Burke et al., 2010),
it is apparent that an interesting next step would be to study
the development of these processes using model-based fMRI,
ideally in a longitudinal fashion. Imitation plays a crucial role
for the acquisition of behavior from early infancy on (for
example during language acquisition). The modeling account
introduced here might prove useful to study the building blocks
of imitative behavior, namely observed action prediction errors
in toddlers. In the absence of choice data in early childhood
studies, computational models could be fit to eye tracking
data like saccadic response speed or pupillometry (Vossel
et al., 2014; Hepach and Westermann, 2016) or electrodermal
activity (Li et al., 2011b), using response models for continuous
data.
Interestingly, an fMRI study in young adults has recently
looked at the involvement of model-based processes in
observational learning (Dunne et al., 2016). In this study, model-
based observational prediction errors that are used to update
one’s internal model about the environment were associated
with activation in the fronto-parietal network. Because model-
based learning abilities change markedly over the course of
one’s lifespan (see above) and recent findings show that social
cognition might age differently than non-social cognition (Reiter
et al., 2017b), it would be intriguing to study model-based social
learning processes from a (lifespan) developmental perspective.
Learning from Social Feedback
Humans are particularly prone to learning from social
reinforcers, like a smile, praise, or a compliment and sensitive
to learning from social punishment, like exclusion or rejection.
From early childhood until later life, social feedback plays a
crucial role during development and education in many areas,
including language development or the development of social
competences (Gros-Louis et al., 2006; Sebastian et al., 2010;
Shinohara et al., 2012; Warlaumont et al., 2014). Translated
to the RL modeling framework, this means that r(s′) for the
computation of reward prediction errors (see Equation 1) can be
social in nature. Indeed, neuroimaging studies have suggested a
“common neural currency” for basic and social rewards (Behrens
et al., 2008, 2009; Lin et al., 2011; Kishida and Montague,
2012) by demonstrating that social and monetary rewards elicit
activation in overlapping brain regions.
In the developmental domain, one study (Jones et al.,
2014) investigated learning from social feedback in children,
adolescents and adults using a probabilistic learning task in
combination with RL modeling and fMRI. In this study,
different social cues were associated with different social reward
probabilities. Social reward consisted of receiving a note from the
co-player indicating interest in the participant. Surprisingly, the
authors found a quadratic effect on learning rates for positive
social feedback: Adolescents showed lower learning rates for
positive feedback than children or adults. As discussed by the
authors, this is in contrast to the common notion of higher
sensitivity toward social reward in adolescents (Somerville,
2013; Foulkes and Blakemore, 2016). The authors argue that
adolescents differentiate less between the cues that are associated
with different amounts of positive social feedback.
Future studies interested in developmental differences
regarding sensitivity to social feedback might more explicitly
contrast learning from social reinforcers with learning from other
(e.g., monetary) reinforcers across the lifespan. Computationally,
fitting r(s′) as a free parameter (i.e., as a measure of reinforcement
sensitivity; Gold et al., 2012), allows to compare sensitivity toward
different types of reinforcers (e.g., social vs. monetary) between
age groups. Recent modeling accounts have also captured
subjective relevance in a Pavlovian conditioning approach
(Katthagen, 2017). These computational approaches could be
particularly suitable to re-assess the postulated higher relevance
of social feedback in adolescence (Blakemore, 2008; Foulkes and
Blakemore, 2016) using a modeling approach.
Learning from Others’ Instructions
A human-specific ability pivotal for development and education
is the ability to learn from others’ instructions. For example, we
do not need to burn our hands to learn not to touch a hot stove;
a verbal warning from others is usually sufficient.
In RL modeling terms, instructions prior to one’s own
experience can be operationalized by changing the initial state-
action value (i.e., in an experimental setting the state-action value
of the first trial of an experiment) according to an instruction
received before one’s own experiences with this stimulus are
gained. In the example above, this might mean that someone
has actually told you how exceptionally tasty the chocolate ice
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cream from a certain ice cream parlor is. Instead of starting
the ice cream tasting from scratch (i.e., in computational terms,
with equal initial state-action values for all ice creams of 0,
respectively), you might be biased toward white chocolate ice
cream now (which might have a higher state-action value of, e.g.,
0.8) before you have actually tasted it. To also model an ongoing
effect of instructed knowledge during learning, an additional
parameter can be introduced to the equation for updating state-
action values which amplifies gains and reduces losses following
the choice of the instructed stimulus (Doll et al., 2009).
Q (s, ainstructed)←
{
Q (s, ainstructed)+ αinstructed α+δ if δ ≥ 0
Q (s, ainstructed)+
α−
αinstructed
δ if δ < 0
(9)
Here, αinstructed represents a parameter capturing instruction-
biased updating. Neuroimaging studies in young adults have
shown that instructions about rewarding outcomes modulate
learning-related responses in the striatum (Doll et al., 2009;
Li et al., 2011a) and vmPFC (Li et al., 2011a) and that this
modulation might be dependent on the prefrontal cortex (Doll
et al., 2009, 2011; Li et al., 2011a). This points toward the
direction that learning from instructions builds upon the circuit
that also supports learning through own experience.
So far, one study compared children, adolescents, and adults
with respect to experiential reward learning vs. social instruction
in a probabilistic reward learning task using computational RL
modeling (Decker et al., 2015). While inaccurate instruction
biased adults’ estimations of a stimulus value, children and
adolescents relied on their own experiences when estimating
stimulus values through experience. These data suggest that when
explicit instruction conflicts with experiential feedback about the
value of an action, children, and adolescents weight their own
experience more heavily. The prefrontal-striatal brain circuitry,
which instruction learning builds upon, continues to mature
into adulthood, which might serve as an explanation for these
differences in learning between age groups.
Based on the reviewed developmental differences in
instruction-based learning, it would be interesting to investigate
how social feedback from different sources affects learning. In
Decker et al. (2015), instructions were displayed on the screen
without manipulating factors like the age (e.g., peer group vs.
adult) or social distance (e.g., family member vs. friend vs.
stranger) of the instructor. Such an experimental manipulation
would allow fitting different bias parameters αinstructed for
each social source condition, which could subsequently be
compared between age groups. It should be noted, however,
that manipulating social information in a laboratory can be
very challenging, and the question arises whether the mere
presentation of a face on a computer screen is sufficient to count
as “social.” For future studies, it will be crucial to compare a
laboratory situation to settings that are more naturalistic and
under “real-life” constraints such as in school or kindergarten.
Learning about Others’ Mind
To understand when and how children develop their capacity
to infer other people’s mental states (ToM) has long been a
“hot topic” in developmental psychology and has recently been
extended toward research on lifespan development of social
cognition (Henry et al., 2013; Reiter et al., 2017b). One influential
idea concerning the implementation of ToM is that humans use
and continuously update models for simulating and predicting
others’ behavior (Yoshida et al., 2008; Boorman et al., 2009;
Diaconescu et al., 2014). One particular aspect of ToM is to infer
the (potentially time-varying) motives of others during social
interaction from their actions in order to determine their fidelity.
Such social learning about others has recently also been translated
into a computational model. In an experiment applied to young
adults, participants were required to learn about the intentions
of a confederate of whom they received advice to inform their
next choice. The confederate’s motivation to help or mislead (i.e.,
his fidelity) changed over time (Behrens et al., 2008; Diaconescu
et al., 2014). In such a scenario, in computational terms, players
would update an estimate of the confederate‘s fidelity, namely
the probability of (un)faithful advice, according to the observed
accuracy of the advice by concurrently tracking the congruency
of advice and outcome. This idea could be incorporated into RL
models; however Bayesian modeling approaches seem to be even
better able to account for empirical data in this task (Diaconescu
et al., 2014, 2017).
Applying the suggested modeling approaches for learning
about other people’s motives to developmental questions
opens promising avenues for understanding the development
of social cognition and social interaction. Tying together
findings in young adults that social inference is influenced
by uncertainty estimates, and findings from the non-social
domain that uncertainty representation changes over the
course of the lifespan (Nassar et al., 2016; van den Bos and
Hertwig, 2017), it would be very interesting to investigate
whether and how changes in uncertainty representation
contribute to previously reported developmental differences in
social cognition. Moreover, a recent study has demonstrated
that distinct social prediction errors are associated with
activation in different neuro-modulatory systems, respectively
(Diaconescu et al., 2017): Lower-level prediction errors which
updated predictions about an adviser’s fidelity activated
the dopaminergic midbrain, and genotypes favoring higher
concentrations of dopamine were related to higher striatal
activation associated with fidelity prediction errors. Higher-
level prediction errors, updating the volatility of an adviser’s
intentions were associated with activation in the cholinergic basal
forebrain. Notably, both neurotransmitter systems, dopamine,
and acetylcholine, undergo marked changes over the course of
the lifespan.
CONCLUSION
In this review, we illustrated how researchers in the field
of developmental cognitive neuroscience can make use of
computational models to gain a more mechanistic understanding
of lifespan differences in learning and decision-making. For both
social and non-social settings, RL models provide a powerful
technique to formalize the underlying mechanisms. Parameters
that are derived from these models can be used to study
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developmental changes in learning and decision-making as well
as the associated neural correlates.
We acknowledge that we are still in the early stages of this
research. Some results seem to be inconsistent, possibly due to
small sample sizes, differences in the employed paradigms or
computational models. For instance, the studies investigating
altered neural reward prediction error representations during
adolescence (Cohen et al., 2010; van den Bos et al., 2012;
Christakou et al., 2013) used different tasks (Iowa Gambling
Task and a probabilistic learning task) with or without monetary
rewards, and employed RL models that did or did not
account for distinct learning rates after relative gains or losses.
Future research should aim to identify the important boundary
conditions of age-related effects. Furthermore, age-comparative
fMRI studies tend to require many resources and therefore often
do not involve large sample sizes, which complicates comparisons
across studies. Moreover, to our knowledge all studies so far rely
on cross-sectional designs, which limits the interpretability of the
results. It would be desirable to fill this gap and to track the
developmental trajectories of the computational underpinnings
for learning and decision-making in a longitudinal manner.
In psychiatry, there is an increasing awareness that a
computational understanding of mental illnesses is needed
to improve clinical treatments (Montague et al., 2012; Huys
et al., 2016; Reiter et al., 2017a). We believe that it is likewise
necessary to comprehend the computational groundings of
learning and decision-making during healthy development. This
would allow us to create better learning environments in
educational and occupational settings and adapt them to the
specific needs of different age groups. Successful attempts along
this direction have already been made. For example, in a study
by Raufelder et al. (2016) learning rates and neural prediction
error signals in a reversal learning task could be linked to different
scholastic motivation types in adolescent pupils. We believe
that several aspects of learning and decision-making discussed
above also are of great practical relevance, such as learning from
negative and positive feedback, the regulation of cognitive effort
during (model-based) decision-making or the implications of
learning from observations and instructions. Thus, knowing and
understanding the cognitive processes involved in different types
of learning and how they change with development might finally
lead to advancements in lifelong education. Computational
models constitute an essential part in this enterprise.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
FB, AR, and BE conceived the theoretical ideas; FB and AR
conducted the literature review; FB, AR, and BE wrote the
manuscript.
FUNDING
This work was supported by a grant from the GermanMinistry of
Education and Research (BMBF EMOTISK 16SV7243) and by a
grant from the German Research Foundation (DFG) (SFB 940/2
B7) awarded to BE. We acknowledge support by the German
Research Foundation and the Open Access Publication Funds of
the TU Dresden.
REFERENCES
Ainsworth, M. D. (1989). Attachments beyond infancy. Am. Psychol. 44, 709–716.
Aron, A. R., Robbins, T. W., and Poldrack, R. A. (2004). Inhibition
and the right inferior frontal cortex. Trends Cogn. Sci. 8, 170–177.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.010
Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one
against a unanimous majority. Psychol. Monogr. 70:1.
Behrens, T. E., Hunt, L. T., and Rushworth,M. F. (2009). The computation of social
behavior. Science 324, 1160–1164. doi: 10.1126/science.1169694
Behrens, T. E., Hunt, L. T., Woolrich, M. W., and Rushworth, M. F.
(2008). Associative learning of social value. Nature 456, 245–249.
doi: 10.1038/nature07538
Blakemore, S. J. (2008). The social brain in adolescence. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9:267.
doi: 10.1038/nrn2353
Boorman, E. D., Behrens, T. E., Woolrich, M. W., and Rushworth, M. F.
(2009). How green is the grass on the other side? Frontopolar cortex and
the evidence in favor of alternative courses of action. Neuron 62, 733–743.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2009.05.014
Braver, T. S., and Barch, D. M. (2002). A theory of cognitive control, aging
cognition, and neuromodulation. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 26, 809–817.
Burke, C. J., Tobler, P. N., Baddeley, M., and Schultz, W. (2010). Neural
mechanisms of observational learning. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107,
14431–14436. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1003111107
Buzzell, G. A., Richards, J. E., White, L. K., Barker, T. V., Pine, D. S., and Fox, N.
A. (2017). Development of the error-monitoring system from ages 9-35: unique
insight provided by MRI-constrained source localization of EEG. Neuroimage
157, 13–26. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2017.05.045
Chowdhury, R., Guitart-Masip, M., Lambert, C., Dayan, P., Huys, Q., Duzel, E.,
et al. (2013). Dopamine restores reward prediction errors in old age. Nat.
Neurosci. 16, 648–653. doi: 10.1038/nn.3364
Christakou, A., Gershman, S. J., Niv, Y., Simmons, A., Brammer, M., and
Rubia, K. (2013). Neural and psychological maturation of decision-making
in adolescence and young adulthood. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 25, 1807–1823.
doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00447
Cohen, J. R., Asarnow, R. F., Sabb, F. W., Bilder, R. M., Bookheimer, S. Y.,
Knowlton, B. J., et al. (2010). A unique adolescent response to reward prediction
errors. Nat. Neurosci. 13, 669–671. doi: 10.1038/nn.2558
Crone, E. A., and Dahl, R. E. (2012). Understanding adolescence as a period of
social-affective engagement and goal flexibility.Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 13, 636–650.
doi: 10.1038/nrn3313
Crone, E. A., and Steinbeis, N. (2017). Neural perspectives on cognitive control
development during childhood and adolescence. Trends Cogn. Sci. 21, 205–215.
doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2017.01.003
Crone, E. A., Jennings, J. R., and Van der Molen, M. W. (2004). Developmental
change in feedback processing as reflected by phasic heart rate changes. Dev.
Psychol. 40, 1228–1238. doi: 10.1037/0012-1649.40.6.1228
D’Ardenne, K., McClure, S. M., Nystrom, L. E., and Cohen, J. D. (2008). BOLD
responses reflecting dopaminergic signals in the human ventral tegmental area.
Science 319, 1264–1267. doi: 10.1126/science.1150605
Daw, N. D., Gershman, S. J., Seymour, B., Dayan, P., and Dolan, R. J. (2011).
Model-based influences on humans’ choices and striatal prediction errors.
Neuron 69, 1204–1215. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2011.02.027
Daw, N. D., Niv, Y., and Dayan, P. (2005). Uncertainty-based competition
between prefrontal and dorsolateral striatal systems for behavioral control.Nat.
Neurosci. 8, 1704–1711. doi: 10.1038/nn1560
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 November 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2048
Bolenz et al. Developmental Changes in Learning
Daw, N. D., O’Doherty, J. P., Dayan, P., Seymour, B., and Dolan, R. J. (2006).
Cortical substrates for exploratory decisions in humans. Nature 441, 876–879.
doi: 10.1038/nature04766
de Boer, L., Axelsson, J., Riklund, K., Nyberg, L., Dayan, P., Backman, L.,
et al. (2017). Attenuation of dopamine-modulated prefrontal value signals
underlies probabilistic reward learning deficits in old age. Elife 6:e26424.
doi: 10.7554/eLife.26424
Decker, J. H., Lourenco, F. S., Doll, B. B., and Hartley, C. A. (2015). Experiential
reward learning outweighs instruction prior to adulthood. Cogn. Affect. Behav.
Neurosci. 15, 310–320. doi: 10.3758/s13415-014-0332-5
Decker, J. H., Otto, A. R., Daw, N. D., and Hartley, C. A. (2016). From
creatures of habit to goal-directed learners: tracking the developmental
emergence of model-based reinforcement learning. Psychol. Sci. 27, 848–858.
doi: 10.1177/0956797616639301
Delgado, M. R., Li, J., Schiller, D., and Phelps, E. A. (2008). The role of the striatum
in aversive learning and aversive prediction errors. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond.
B Biol. Sci. 363, 3787–3800. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0161
Diaconescu, A. O., Mathys, C., Weber, L. A., Daunizeau, J., Kasper, L., Lomakina,
E. I., et al. (2014). Inferring on the intentions of others by hierarchical Bayesian
learning. PLoS Comput. Biol. 10:e1003810. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003810
Diaconescu, A. O., Mathys, C., Weber, L. A., Kasper, L., Mauer, J., and Stephan, K.
E. (2017). Hierarchical prediction errors in midbrain and septum during social
learning. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 12, 618–634. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsw171
Doll, B. B., Hutchison, K. E., and Frank, M. J. (2011). Dopaminergic genes predict
individual differences in susceptibility to confirmation bias. J. Neurosci. 31,
6188–6198. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6486-10.2011
Doll, B. B., Jacobs, W. J., Sanfey, A. G., and Frank, M. J. (2009). Instructional
control of reinforcement learning: a behavioral and neurocomputational
investigation. Brain Res. 1299, 74–94. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2009.07.007
Dunne, S., D’Souza, A., and O’Doherty, J. P. (2016). The involvement of
model-based but not model-free learning signals during observational
reward learning in the absence of choice. J. Neurophysiol. 115, 3195–3203.
doi: 10.1152/jn.00046.2016
Eppinger, B., Mock, B., and Kray, J. (2009). Developmental differences in learning
and error processing: evidence from ERPs. Psychophysiology 46, 1043–1053.
doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2009.00838.x
Eppinger, B., Schuck, N. W., Nystrom, L. E., and Cohen, J. D. (2013a). Reduced
striatal responses to reward prediction errors in older compared with younger
adults. J. Neurosci. 33, 9905–9912. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2942-12.2013
Eppinger, B., Walter, M., and Li, S. C. (2017). Electrophysiological correlates reflect
the integration of model-based and model-free decision information. Cogn.
Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 17, 406–421. doi: 10.3758/s13415-016-0487-3
Eppinger, B.,Walter, M., Heekeren, H. R., and Li, S. C. (2013b). Of goals and habits:
age-related and individual differences in goal-directed decision-making. Front.
Neurosci. 7:253. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2013.00253
Fiske, S. T. (2009). Social Beings: Core Motives in Social Psychology. Hoboken, NJ:
John Wiley & Sons.
Foulkes, L., and Blakemore, S.-J. (2016). Is there heightened sensitivity
to social reward in adolescence? Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 40, 81–85.
doi: 10.1016/j.conb.2016.06.016
Frith, U., and Frith, C. D. (2003). Development and neurophysiology of
mentalizing. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 358, 459–473.
doi: 10.1098/rstb.2002.1218
Gläscher, J., Daw, N., Dayan, P., and O’Doherty, J. P. (2010). States
versus rewards: dissociable neural prediction error signals underlying
model-based and model-free reinforcement learning. Neuron 66, 585–595.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2010.04.016
Gläscher, J., Hampton, A. N., and O’Doherty, J. P. (2009). Determining a
role for ventromedial prefrontal cortex in encoding action-based value
signals during reward-related decision making. Cereb. Cortex 19, 483–495.
doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhn098
Gogtay, N., Giedd, J. N., Lusk, L., Hayashi, K. M., Greenstein, D., Vaituzis,
A. C., et al. (2004). Dynamic mapping of human cortical development
during childhood through early adulthood. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 101,
8174–8179. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0402680101
Gold, J. M., Waltz, J. A., Matveeva, T. M., Kasanova, Z., Strauss, G. P., Herbener, E.
S., et al. (2012). Negative symptoms and the failure to represent the expected
reward value of actions: behavioral and computational modeling evidence.
Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 69, 129–138. doi: 10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2011.1269
Gros-Louis, J., West, M. J., Goldstein, M. H., and King, A. P. (2006). Mothers
provide differential feedback to infants’ prelinguistic sounds. Int. J. Behav. Dev.
30, 509–516. doi: 10.1177/0165025406071914
Hauser, T. U., Iannaccone, R., Walitza, S., Brandeis, D., and Brem, S.
(2015). Cognitive flexibility in adolescence: neural and behavioral
mechanisms of reward prediction error processing in adaptive
decision making during development. Neuroimage 104, 347–354.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.09.018
Henry, J. D., Phillips, L. H., Ruffman, T., and Bailey, P. E. (2013). A meta-
analytic review of age differences in theory of mind. Psychol. Aging 28, 826–839.
doi: 10.1037/a0030677
Hepach, R., andWestermann, G. (2016). Pupillometry in infancy research. J. Cogn.
Dev. 17, 359–377. doi: 10.1080/15248372.2015.1135801
Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., and Tomasello, M.
(2007). Humans have evolved specialized skills of social cognition: the cultural
intelligence hypothesis. Science 317, 1360–1366. doi: 10.1126/science.11
46282
Holroyd, C. B., and Coles, M. G. H. (2002). The neural basis of human error
processing: reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related negativity.
Psychol. Rev. 109, 679–709. doi: 10.1037//0033-295x.109.4.679
Huys, Q. J., Maia, T. V., and Frank, M. J. (2016). Computational psychiatry as a
bridge from neuroscience to clinical applications. Nat. Neurosci. 19, 404–413.
doi: 10.1038/nn.4238
Javadi, A. H., Schmidt, D. H., and Smolka, M. N. (2014). Adolescents adapt more
slowly than adults to varying reward contingencies. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 26,
2670–2681. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00677
Jones, R. M., Somerville, L. H., Li, J., Ruberry, E. J., Powers, A., Mehta, N., et al.
(2014). Adolescent-specific patterns of behavior and neural activity during
social reinforcement learning. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 14, 683–697.
doi: 10.3758/s13415-014-0257-z
Katthagen, T. (2017). The Computational Mechanisms of Aberrant Salience and
Dysfunctional Relevance Attribution in Schizophrenia. Doctoral dissertation,
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Germany.
Kishida, K. T., and Montague, P. R. (2012). Imaging models of valuation
during social interaction in humans. Biol. Psychiatry 72, 93–100.
doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2012.02.037
Kool, W., Gershman, S. J., and Cushman, F. (2017). Cost-benefit arbitration
between multiple reinforcement-learning systems. Psychol. Sci. 28, 1321–1333.
doi: 10.1177/0956797617708288
Krugel, L. K., Biele, G., Mohr, P. N., Li, S. C., and Heekeren, H. R. (2009). Genetic
variation in dopaminergic neuromodulation influences the ability to rapidly
and flexibly adapt decisions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106, 17951–17956.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.0905191106
Lawson, R. P., Mathys, C., and Rees, G. (2017). Adults with autism overestimate
the volatility of the sensory environment. Nat. Neurosci. 20, 1293–1299.
doi: 10.1038/nn.4615
Lee, S. W., Shimojo, S., and O’Doherty, J. P. (2014). Neural computations
underlying arbitration between model-based and model-free learning. Neuron
81, 687–699. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2013.11.028
Lewin, K. (1952). “Group decision and social change,” in Readings in Social
Psychology, eds G. E. Swanson, T. M. Newcomb, and E. L. Hartley (New York,
NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston), 197–211.
Li, J., Delgado, M. R., and Phelps, E. A. (2011a). How instructed knowledge
modulates the neural systems of reward learning. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.
108, 55–60. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1014938108
Li, J., Schiller, D., Schoenbaum, G., Phelps, E. A., and Daw, N. D. (2011b).
Differential roles of human striatum and amygdala in associative learning. Nat.
Neurosci. 14, 1250–1252. doi: 10.1038/nn.2904
Li, S. C., and Eppinger, B. (2016). “Lifespan development of adaptive
neurocognitive representations: Reciprocal interactions between cognition and
motivation,” inMotivation and Cognitive Control, ed T. Braver (New York, NY:
Routledge), 283–312.
Li, S. C., and Rieckmann, A. (2014). Neuromodulation and aging: implications of
aging neuronal gain control on cognition. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 29, 148–158.
doi: 10.1016/j.conb.2014.07.009
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 November 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2048
Bolenz et al. Developmental Changes in Learning
Li, S. C., Lindenberger, U., and Backman, L. (2010). Dopaminergic modulation
of cognition across the life span. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 34, 625–630.
doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2010.02.003
Lin, A., Adolphs, R., and Rangel, A. (2011). Social and monetary reward learning
engage overlapping neural substrates. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 7, 274–281.
doi: 10.1093/scan/nsr006
Luna, B., Marek, S., Larsen, B., Tervo-Clemmens, B., and Chahal, R. (2015). An
integrative model of the maturation of cognitive control. Annu. Rev. Neurosci.
38, 151–170. doi: 10.1146/annurev-neuro-071714-034054
Maier, M. E., Di Gregorio, F., Muricchio, T., and Di Pellegrino, G. (2015).
Impaired rapid error monitoring but intact error signaling following rostral
anterior cingulate cortex lesions in humans. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 9:339.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00339
Meltzoff, A. N. (2013). “Origins of Social Cognition: Bidirectional self-other
mapping and the “Like-Me” hypothesis,” in Navigating the Social World: What
Infants, Children, and Other Species Can Teach Us, eds M. R. Banaji and S. A.
Gelman (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), 139–144.
Montague, P. R., Dolan, R. J., Friston, K. J., and Dayan, P. (2012). Computational
psychiatry. Trends Cogn. Sci. 16, 72–80. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.018
Montague, P. R., Hyman, S. E., and Cohen, J. D. (2004). Computational
roles for dopamine in behavioural control. Nature 431, 760–767.
doi: 10.1038/nature03015
Nassar, M. R., Bruckner, R., Gold, J. I., Li, S. C., Heekeren, H. R., and
Eppinger, B. (2016). Age differences in learning emerge from an insufficient
representation of uncertainty in older adults. Nat. Commun. 7:11609.
doi: 10.1038/ncomms11609
Nielsen, M., and Tomaselli, K. (2010). Overimitation in Kalahari Bushman
children and the origins of human cultural cognition. Psychol. Sci. 21, 729–736.
doi: 10.1177/0956797610368808
O’Doherty, J. P., Hampton, A., and Kim, H. (2007). Model-based fMRI and its
application to reward learning and decision making. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1104,
35–53. doi: 10.1196/annals.1390.022
O’Doherty, J., Dayan, P., Schultz, J., Deichmann, R., Friston, K., and Dolan, R.
J. (2004). Dissociable roles of ventral and dorsal striatum in instrumental
conditioning. Science 304, 452–454. doi: 10.1126/science.1094285
Otto, A. R., Gershman, S. J., Markman, A. B., and Daw, N. D. (2013a). The curse
of planning: dissecting multiple reinforcement-learning systems by taxing the
central executive. Psychol. Sci. 24, 751–761. doi: 10.1177/0956797612463080
Otto, A. R., Raio, C. M., Chiang, A., Phelps, E. A., and Daw, N. D.
(2013b).Working-memory capacity protects model-based learning from stress.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 110, 20941–20946. doi: 10.1073/pnas.13120
11110
Palminteri, S., Justo, D., Jauffret, C., Pavlicek, B., Dauta, A., Delmaire,
C., et al. (2012). Critical roles for anterior insula and dorsal striatum
in punishment-based avoidance learning. Neuron 76, 998–1009.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.017
Palminteri, S., Kilford, E. J., Coricelli, G., and Blakemore, S. J. (2016). The
computational development of reinforcement learning during adolescence.
PLoS Comput. Biol. 12:e1004953. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004953
Potter, T. C. S., Bryce, N. V., and Hartley, C. A. (2017). Cognitive components
underpinning the development of model-based learning. Dev. Cogn. Neurosci.
25, 272–280. doi: 10.1016/j.dcn.2016.10.005
Radenbach, C., Reiter, A. M., Engert, V., Sjoerds, Z., Villringer, A., Heinze,
H. J., et al. (2015). The interaction of acute and chronic stress impairs
model-based behavioral control. Psychoneuroendocrinology 53, 268–280.
doi: 10.1016/j.psyneuen.2014.12.017
Raufelder, D., Boehme, R., Romund, L., Golde, S., Lorenz, R. C., Gleich, T., et al.
(2016). Does feedback-related brain response during reinforcement learning
predict socio-motivational (in-)dependence in adolescence? Front. Psychol.
7:655. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00655
Reiter, A. M. F., Heinz, A., and Deserno, L. (2017a). Linking social context
and addiction neuroscience: a computational psychiatry approach. Nat. Rev.
Neurosci. 18:450. doi: 10.1038/nrn.2017.67
Reiter, A. M. F., Kanske, P., Eppinger, B., and Li, S. C. (2017b). The aging of the
social mind - differential effects on components of social understanding. Sci.
Rep. 7:11046. doi: 10.1038/s41598-017-10669-4
Reiter, A. M. F., Koch, S. P., Schröger, E., Hinrichs, H., Heinze, H.-J., Deserno,
L., et al. (2016). The feedback-related negativity codes components of
abstract inference during reward-based decision-making. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 28,
1127–1138. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00957
Ridderinkhof, K. R., Ullsperger, M., Crone, E. A., and Nieuwenhuis, S. (2004). The
role of the medial frontal cortex in cognitive control. Science 306, 443–447.
doi: 10.1126/science.1100301
Rodriguez Buritica, J. M., Eppinger, B., Schuck, N. W., Heekeren, H. R., and Li, S.
C. (2016). Electrophysiological correlates of observational learning in children.
Dev. Sci. 19, 699–709. doi: 10.1111/desc.12317
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Worthy, D. A., Mata, R., McClure, S. M., and Knutson,
B. (2014). Adult age differences in frontostriatal representation of prediction
error but not reward outcome. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 14, 672–682.
doi: 10.3758/s13415-014-0297-4
Schuck, N. W., Cai, M. B., Wilson, R. C., and Niv, Y. (2016). Human orbitofrontal
cortex represents a cognitive map of state space. Neuron 91, 1402–1412.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2016.08.019
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., and Montague, P. R. (1997). A neural substrate of
prediction and reward. Science 275, 1593–1599.
Sebastian, C., Viding, E., Williams, K. D., and Blakemore, S.-J. (2010). Social brain
development and the affective consequences of ostracism in adolescence. Brain
Cogn. 72, 134–145. doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2009.06.008
Shaw, P., Kabani, N. J., Lerch, J. P., Eckstrand, K., Lenroot, R., Gogtay, N.,
et al. (2008). Neurodevelopmental trajectories of the human cerebral cortex.
J. Neurosci. 28, 3586–3594. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5309-07.2008
Shinohara, R., Sugisawa, Y., Tong, L., Tanaka, E., Watanabe, T., Onda, Y., et al.
(2012). Influence of maternal praise on developmental trajectories of early
childhood social competence. Creat. Educ. 3:533. doi: 10.4236/ce.2012.34081
Somerville, L. H. (2013). The teenage brain: sensitivity to social evaluation. Curr.
Dir. Psychol. Sci. 22, 121–127. doi: 10.1177/0963721413476512
Somerville, L. H., Sasse, S. F., Garrad, M. C., Drysdale, A. T., Abi Akar, N., Insel, C.,
et al. (2017). Charting the expansion of strategic exploratory behavior during
adolescence. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 146, 155–164. doi: 10.1037/xge0000250
Sowell, E. R., Peterson, B. S., Thompson, P. M., Welcome, S. E., Henkenius, A. L.,
and Toga, A. W. (2003). Mapping cortical change across the human life span.
Nat. Neurosci. 6, 309–315. doi: 10.1038/nn1008
Sutton, R. S., and Barto, A. G. (1998). Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Suzuki, S., Harasawa, N., Ueno, K., Gardner, J. L., Ichinohe, N., Haruno, M.,
et al. (2012). Learning to simulate others’ decisions. Neuron 74, 1125–1137.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2012.04.030
Tobia, M. J., Guo, R., Glascher, J., Schwarze, U., Brassen, S., Buchel, C., et al.
(2016). Altered behavioral and neural responsiveness to counterfactual
gains in the elderly. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 16, 457–472.
doi: 10.3758/s13415-016-0406-7
Tomasello, M., Davis-Dasilva, M., Camak, L., and Bard, K. (1987). Observational
learning of tool-use by young chimpanzees. Hum. Evol. 2, 175–183.
Ullsperger, M., and von Cramon, D. Y. (2003). Error monitoring using external
feedback: specific roles of the habenular complex, the reward system, and the
cingulate motor area revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging. J.
Neurosci. 23, 4308–4314.
Ullsperger, M., Fischer, A. G., Nigbur, R., and Endrass, T. (2014). Neural
mechanisms and temporal dynamics of performance monitoring. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 18, 259–267. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.02.009
van den Bos, W., Bruckner, R., Nassar, M. R., Mata, R., and Eppinger, B. (2017).
Computational neuroscience across the lifespan: promises and pitfalls. Dev.
Cogn. Neurosci. doi: 10.1016/j.dcn.2017.09.008. [Epub ahead of print].
van den Bos, W., Cohen, M. X., Kahnt, T., and Crone, E. A. (2012).
Striatum-medial prefrontal cortex connectivity predicts developmental
changes in reinforcement learning. Cereb. Cortex 22, 1247–1255.
doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhr198
van den Bos, W., and Hertwig, R. (2017). Adolescents display distinctive tolerance
to ambiguity and to uncertainty during risky decisionmaking. Sci. Rep. 7:40962.
doi: 10.1038/srep40962
van Duijvenvoorde, A. C., Zanolie, K., Rombouts, S. A., Raijmakers, M. E.,
and Crone, E. A. (2008). Evaluating the negative or valuing the positive?
Neural mechanisms supporting feedback-based learning across development.
J. Neurosci. 28, 9495–9503. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1485-08.2008
Vossel, S., Mathys, C., Daunizeau, J., Bauer, M., Driver, J., Friston, K. J.,
et al. (2014). Spatial attention, precision, and Bayesian inference: a study of
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 November 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2048
Bolenz et al. Developmental Changes in Learning
saccadic response speed. Cereb. Cortex 24, 1436–1450. doi: 10.1093/cercor/
bhs418
Waismeyer, A., and Meltzoff, A. N. (2017). Learning to make things happen:
Infants’ observational learning of social and physical causal events. J. Exp. Child
Psychol. 162, 58–71. doi: 10.1016/j.jecp.2017.04.018
Warlaumont, A. S., Richards, J. A., Gilkerson, J., and Oller, D. K. (2014). A social
feedback loop for speech development and its reduction in autism. Psychol. Sci.
25, 1314–1324. doi: 10.1177/0956797614531023
Wilson, R. C., Geana, A., White, J. M., Ludvig, E. A., and Cohen, J. D. (2014a).
Humans use directed and random exploration to solve the explore-exploit
dilemma. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 143, 2074–2081. doi: 10.1037/a0038199
Wilson, R. C., Takahashi, Y. K., Schoenbaum, G., and Niv, Y. (2014b).
Orbitofrontal cortex as a cognitive map of task space. Neuron 81, 267–279.
doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2013.11.005
Worthy, D. A., Cooper, J. A., Byrne, K. A., Gorlick, M. A., and Maddox,
W. T. (2014). State-based versus reward-based motivation in younger
and older adults. Cogn. Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 14, 1208–1220.
doi: 10.3758/s13415-014-0293-8
Yoshida, W., Dolan, R. J., and Friston, K. J. (2008). Game theory of
mind. PLoS Comput. Biol. 4:e1000254. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.
1000254
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2017 Bolenz, Reiter and Eppinger. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this
journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution
or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 November 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2048
